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1. Information to be published on the methodology used to set the regulated revenue of the transmission system operator The information referred to in points 1 to 5 shall be published before the tariff period by the regulatory authority or the transmission system operator as decided by the regulatory authority. That information shall be provided separately for transmission activities where the transmission system operator is part of a larger commercial entity or holding.

1. The entity responsible for calculating, setting and approving the different components of the methodology.

2. A description of the methodology, including at least a description of:

(a) the overall methodology, such as revenue-cap, hybrid, cost-plus or tariff benchmarking;

(b) the methodology to set the regulatory asset base (RAB), including:

(i) methodology to determine the initial (opening) value of the assets as applied at the start of the relevant regulatory period and when incorporating new assets to the RAB;

(ii) methodology to re-evaluate assets;

(iii) explanations of the evolution of the value of the assets;

(iv) treatment of decommissioned assets;

(v) depreciation methodology applied to the RAB, including any changes applied to the values.

(c) the methodology to set the cost of capital;

(d) the methodology to determine the total expenditure (TOTEX) or, if applicable, operational expenditure (OPEX) and capital expenditure (CAPEX);

(e) the methodology to determine the efficiency of the cost, if applicable;

(f) the methodology applied to set the inflation;

(g) the methodology to determine premia and incentives, if applicable;

(h) non-controllable costs;

(i) services provided within the company holding, if applicable.

3. The values of the parameters used in the methodology:

(a) the detailed values of the parameters that are part of the cost of equity and cost of debt or weighted average cost of capital expressed in percentages;

(b) depreciation periods in years applicable separately to pipelines and compressors;

(c) changes to the depreciation period or in the acceleration of the depreciation applied to assets;

(d) efficiency targets in percentages;

(e) inflation indices;

(f) premia and incentives.

4. The values of costs and expenditure that are used for setting the allowed or target revenue in euro and in the local currency of:

(a) the RAB per asset type detailed per year until its full depreciation, including:

(i) the investments added to the RAB, per asset type;

(ii) the depreciation per asset type until the full depreciation of the assets;

(b) the cost of capital including the cost of equity and the cost of debt;

(c) operational expenditure;

(d) premia and incentives detailed separately per item.

5. Financial indicators to be provided for the transmission system operator. In the event of the transmission system operator being part of a larger holding or undertaking, those values shall be provided separately for the transmission system operator, including:

(a) earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA);

(b) earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT);

(c) return on assets I (ROA) = EBITDA / RAB;

(d) return on assets II (ROA) = EBIT / RAB;

(e) return on equity (ROE) = Profit / Equity:

(i) return on capital employed (RoCE);

(ii) leverage ratio;

(iii) net debt / (Net debt + Equity);

(iv) net debt / EBITDA. The regulatory authority or the transmission system operator shall provide a simplified tariff model including the disaggregated parameters and values of the methodology and allowing to replicate the calculation of the allowed or target revenue of the transmission system operator.

6. Transmission system operators shall maintain and make available to the regulatory authority upon request a daily log of the actual maintenance and flow disruptions that have occurred. Information shall also be made available on request to consumers affected by any disruption.

2. Principles of capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion- management procedures concerning transmission system operators and their application in the event of contractual congestion 2.1. Principles of capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion-management procedures concerning transmission system operators 1. Capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion-management procedures shall facilitate the development of competition and liquid trading of capacity and shall be compatible with market mechanisms including spot markets and trading hubs. They shall be flexible and capable of adapting to evolving market circumstances.

2. Those mechanisms and procedures shall take into account the integrity of the system concerned as well as security of supply.

3. Those mechanisms and procedures shall neither hamper the entry of new market participants nor create undue barriers to market entry. They shall not prevent market participants, including new entrants on the market and companies with a small market share, from competing effectively.

4. Those mechanisms and procedures shall provide appropriate economic signals for efficient and maximum use of technical capacity and facilitate investment in new infrastructure.

5. Network users shall be advised about the type of circumstance that could affect the availability of contracted capacity. Information on interruption shall reflect the level of information available to the transmission system operator.

6. Should difficulties in meeting contractual delivery obligations arise due to system integrity reasons, transmission system operators shall notify network users and seek a non-discriminatory solution without delay. Transmission system operators shall consult network users regarding procedures prior to their implementation and agree them with the regulatory authority.

2.2. Congestion management procedures in the event of contractual congestion 2.2.1. General provisions

1. This point shall apply to interconnection points between adjacent entry-exit systems, irrespective of whether they are physical or virtual, between two or more Member States or within the same Member State in so far as the points are subject to booking procedures by users. This point may also apply to entry points from and exit points to third countries, subject to the decision of the relevant regulatory authority. Exit points to end-consumers and distribution networks, entry points from LNG terminals and production facilities, and entry-exit points from and to natural gas storage facilities are not subject to this point.

2. On the basis of the information published by the transmission system operators pursuant to point 3 of this Annex and, where appropriate, validated by regulatory authorities, ACER shall publish a monitoring report on congestion at interconnection points with respect to firm capacity products sold in the preceding year, taking into consideration to the extent possible capacity trading on the secondary market and the use of interruptible capacity. The monitoring report shall be published every two years. ACER shall publish additional reports, upon a substantiated request from the Commission, no more frequently than once per year.

3. Any additional capacity made available through the application of one of the congestion-management procedures as provided for in points 2.2.2 to 2.2.5 shall be offered by the relevant transmission system operators in the regular allocation process.

2.2.2. Capacity increase through oversubscription and buy-back scheme

1. Transmission system operators shall propose and, after approval by the regulatory authority, implement an incentive-based oversubscription and buy-back scheme in order to offer additional capacity on a firm basis. Before implementation, the regulatory authority shall consult the regulatory authorities of adjacent Member States and take account of the adjacent regulatory authorities’ opinions. Additional capacity refers to the firm capacity offered in addition to the technical capacity of an interconnection point calculated pursuant to Article 6(1).

2. The oversubscription and buy-back scheme shall provide transmission system operators with an incentive to make available additional capacity, taking account of the technical conditions, such as the calorific value, temperature and expected consumption, of the relevant entry-exit system and the capacities in adjacent networks. Transmission system operators shall apply a dynamic approach with regard to the recalculation of the technical or additional capacity of the entry-exit system.

3. The oversubscription and buy-back scheme shall be based on an incentive regime reflecting the risks of transmission system operators in offering additional capacity. That scheme shall be structured in such a way that revenue from selling additional capacity and costs arising from the buy-back scheme or measures pursuant to point 6 are shared between the transmission system operators and the network users. Regulatory authorities shall decide on the distribution of revenue and costs between the transmission system operator and the network user.

4. For the purpose of determining transmission system operators’ revenue, technical capacity, in particular surrendered capacity as well as, where relevant, capacity arising from the application of firm day-ahead use-it-or-lose-it and long-term use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms, shall be considered to be allocated prior to any additional capacity.